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The Curious Incident of Mr Cameron and the
United Kingdom Defence Budget: A New
Legacy?
ANDREW M. DORMAN, MATTHEW R. H. UTTLEY AND BENEDICT
WILKINSON
Abstract
During 2015 Prime Minister Cameron found himself under intense domestic and interna-
tional pressure over his apparent reluctance to maintain United Kingdom defence spending
at the NATO target level of 2 per cent of GDP. Most commentators attributed this reluctance
to the inevitability of defence cuts if the government wished to meet its deﬁcit reduction tar-
gets. However, the aftermath of the general election saw a sudden decision to maintain UK
defence spending at the NATO target level. This u-turn is one of the more curious episodes
in recent British defence policy. In this article we explore the reasons why, at a time of con-
tinuing cuts and austerity measures and against all the political signals, a decision was made
to meet the 2 per cent target, and what this means for the UK’s defence policy. In doing so,
we analyse why most commentators assumed that defence cuts were inevitable, the domestic
and international factors that explain the government’s apparent u-turn and what this
revised defence budget settlement meant for the new 2015 National Security Strategy and
Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Keywords: United Kingdom, defence policy, NATO, Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR), National Security Strategy (NSS)
Introduction
FOR THOSE interested in British defence and
security policy, 2015 witnessed a quite
remarkable government u-turn. From the
government’s election in May 2015 until
early July, all the signals coming from Num-
ber 10 and Number 11 Downing Street were
that defence, along with much of the remain-
ing non-protected areas of government
spending, would be subject to cuts of some-
where between 25 and 40 per cent. In the
debate on the Queen’s Speech in June,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George
Osborne, announced a further £500m in-year
cut in the defence budget, leaving it hover-
ing just above the NATO defence spending
target of 2 per cent of GDP. The Defence Sec-
retary, Michael Fallon, subsequently made a
less-than-subtle grab for the UK’s foreign aid
budget in an attempt to add to the defence
budget. The manoeuvre, however, failed,
despite the support of a number of Conser-
vative backbenchers.
Not surprisingly, the signals of cuts were
met with various calls for the government
to, at the very least, meet the NATO defence
spending target of 2 per cent of GDP. In the
run-up to the May 2015 General Election, the
traditional defence lobby groups of retired
senior ofﬁcers, defence companies and Con-
servative backbench MPs became increas-
ingly vocal. The cacophony of voices steadily
increased and letters were written to The
Times and The Telegraph all calling for the
next government to peg British defence
spending at the NATO target level. More
surprisingly, they were joined after the elec-
tion by a series of public interventions from
Washington, including the outgoing US
Army Chief, General Odierno, incoming
Defense Secretary, Ashton Carter, and ﬁnally
President Obama during the G7 summit in
Germany.2
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Then, in his budget statement of 8 July,
George Osborne announced that the govern-
ment was now fully committed to maintain-
ing defence spending at 2 per cent of GDP
until 2020. Those within the defence commu-
nity breathed a sigh of relief. The 2015
Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR) would no longer need to be as brutal
as its 2010 predecessor. The narrative chan-
ged. Instead of talk of what would be cut,
ofﬁcials now started to talk about ‘up
arrows’ and the potential to help offset some
of the more signiﬁcant capability gaps
created by the 2010 SDSR.
But this was not the end of the story. On
23 November the government published its
new National Security Strategy (NSS) and
SDSR.3 In his statement to the House on the
same day, Prime Minister David Cameron
spoke of an extra £12 billion to be spent on
defence equipment and support over the
coming decade. Britain’s new aircraft carriers
will have aircraft, the army will create two
new ‘strike brigades’ to confront the likes of
so-called Islamic State (IS), the air force will
gain three more fast jet squadrons, buy nine
new maritime patrol aircraft, acquire at least
twenty new advanced drones and much
more.
The response was unlike anything heard
in any recent defence review—virtual silence
from the backbenches and among the coterie
of retired senior ofﬁcers—as the years of
plenty seemed to lie ahead. Among the
opposition there was division and confusion.
Jeremy Corbyn’s response to the Prime Min-
ister’s statement was rambling and confused,
focusing as he did on police numbers rather
than the armed forces. The SNP continued
their anti-Trident rhetoric and, in their
Opposition Day debate the next day, sought
to gain Labour support. Instead, Corbyn
ordered his MPs to abstain, but twenty
ignored him, with fourteen voting in favour
of nuclear replacement and six against.4
A curious tale indeed. Rarely has defence
undergone such rapid policy changes, partic-
ularly in the context of austerity and an atti-
tude of deﬁcit reduction within government.
In light of this, there are pressing questions
about the politics underpinning the u-turn—
and, undoubtedly, lessons to be learned. In
this article, we explore three interrelated
questions: ﬁrst, why did most policy analysts
assume that defence budget cuts were inevi-
table? Second, what international and
domestic factors explain the government’s
u-turn? Finally, how coherent is the latest
SDSR? By answering these questions, we not
only shed light on the factors that inﬂuenced
the most recent SDSR, but also provide an
analysis of the SDSR’s strengths and
limitations.
The inevitability of defence cuts?
Osborne’s 2015 Summer Budget announce-
ment ﬂew in the face of most analysts’
expectations. In 2010, the Coalition govern-
ment cut the defence budget by approxi-
mately 7.5 per cent—a relatively modest
reduction compared to most other Whitehall
departments. Many across Whitehall felt that
in 2015 it was defence’s turn to contribute to
the savings demanded by Osborne.
In their 2015 manifesto the Conservatives
pledged to ‘eliminate the deﬁcit in a sensible
and balanced way that will enable us to con-
tinue to increase spending on the NHS and
cut Income Tax for 30 million working peo-
ple’.5 This included a commitment to ﬁnd a
further £13 billion in departmental savings
plus an additional £12 billion from welfare
cuts in order to move the UK economy into
surplus by 2018–9. The mantra of ‘ﬁscal
responsibility’ was reinforced in the Chancel-
lor’s July 2015 Mansion House speech in
which he announced new legislation pre-
venting future governments from running
budget deﬁcits in years of economic growth.
As Cameron’s foreword to the election
manifesto made clear, the nation’s economic
situation had certainly improved since 2010,
to the extent that the UK has the fastest
growing economy among the G7 states. Nev-
ertheless, the economic growth rate masked
underlying challenges to national public
expenditure and, by implication, to future
defence spending levels. Between 2010 and
2015, the Coalition government had suc-
ceeded in halving Britain’s ﬁscal deﬁcit, but
overall levels of national debt had continued
to grow. The government had pledged to
eliminate the remaining ﬁscal deﬁcit by
2017–18 as a precursor to tackling the
national debt, currently standing at approxi-
mately 86 per cent of GDP. This suggested
expenditure on public services under the
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current parliament would be severely
constrained. To many commentators, the
government’s overall deﬁcit reduction
pledges appeared to presage inevitable and
signiﬁcant UK defence budget cuts.
Further factors convinced analysts that the
government’s willingness and ability to meet
the NATO 2 per cent of GDP target was at
best questionable. National economic recov-
ery during the previous parliament had, in
the words of The Economist, been ‘tax free’,
because it had been achieved through public
expenditure cuts rather than tax rises.6 The
Conservatives’ pre-election pledge not to
increase taxes during the current parliament
meant that the sole remaining policy tool
available to government in meeting its debt
reduction targets was further and deeper
public expenditure cutbacks. At the same
time, pre-election pledges to ‘ring fence’ the
NHS, international development and educa-
tion budgets indicated that the remaining
‘unprotected’ Whitehall departments would
have to absorb substantial cuts to meet other
public expenditure targets. By inference, this
suggested sizeable reductions to the two lar-
gest ‘unprotected’ departmental budgets—
social provision (welfare and pensions) and
defence—because departmental cuts else-
where in the remaining smaller departments
could not deliver anything like the requisite
savings. All the omens and portents, then,
suggested that the Ministry of Defence
(MoD) would be a key locus for deep cuts.
And, taken together with the Prime Minis-
ter’s silence, all the signs were that the UK
would fail to meet the 2 per cent target.
Why the u-turn?
It was to the surprise of many, then, that the
Chancellor announced that the UK would
meet the golden 2 per cent ﬁgure. To be
clear, we are not criticising this decision.
Indeed, as we have argued elsewhere, there
are numerous security, strategic and eco-
nomic beneﬁts to defence expenditure.7
Nonetheless, the question remains—why this
curious decision? We suggest four different
factors came together to encourage such a
remarkable u-turn.
First, it was unprecedented for a US
administration to have been quite so outspo-
ken about the UK defence budget just as a
new British government was embarking on a
review of its National Security Strategy and
conducting an SDSR. A Washington Post arti-
cle headline—’Britain resigns as a world
power’—captured the US zeitgeist.8 Similar
concerns were echoed by a former British
NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, General Sir Richard Sherriff, who
suggested that the UK had become ‘a foreign
policy irrelevance’.9 Further aﬁeld, concern
about the absence of a ‘British voice’—partic-
ularly on Russian-sponsored insurgency in
eastern Ukraine—had been mooted by the
leaders of several European NATO states.
There were murmurings that France had suc-
ceeded the UK as Washington’s most trusted
ally after the US Navy sought additional air-
craft carrier support in the Persian Gulf and
only France was available to assist, which
made matters still worse.
In theory, Cameron could have disre-
garded the overtures from Washington by
simply prioritising national deﬁcit reduction
—either by reducing defence expenditure to
below the NATO 2 per cent of GDP target
or including other elements of existing
spending, such as military pensions, to paper
over the fall below 2 per cent. Both options
would then require the UK to ‘free-ride’ on
the US for areas of collective security provi-
sions through NATO and other strategic
alliances. Free-riding on the defence expendi-
ture and military capabilities of allies is, after
all, not new. For some states, notably Japan
and the former West Germany, anti-militaristic
constitutions imposed on them after the Sec-
ond World War enabled free-riding on US
security guarantees. Similarly, during the
Cold War, security guarantees provided by
the US nuclear deterrent enabled many smal-
ler NATO states to maintain relatively low
defence budgets.
However, free-riding was simply out of
the question for Cameron. It would not have
sat comfortably with the Conservatives’
repeated assertions that the UK aspired to
continue its overt global security role,
reﬂected in its roles as a permanent member
of the UN Security Council, its security pro-
vision for its thirteen Dependent Territories
and treaty and alliance commitments rang-
ing from NATO to the Five Power Defence
Agreement. Nor would it have sat well with
the now more challenging international
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security environment. While the UK had
largely managed to extricate its forces from
the NATO mission to Afghanistan by 2015,
the combination of the Arab Spring, the US
pivot to Asia, Russia’s seizure of the Crimea
and Ukrainian civil war, the Syrian civil war
and the rise of IS presented existential risks
and threats to regional and global security.
The second factor associated with a policy
of free-riding was that Cameron would also
have exposed himself to domestic and inter-
national accusations of hypocrisy if the UK
failed to meet the 2 per cent target. At the
NATO summit in September 2014, he chas-
tised NATO allies for failing to meet this
very ﬁgure in an effort to show Washington
that the UK remained a staunch ally. This
was particularly aimed at reassuring the
Obama administration about the UK’s
dependability in light of the British parlia-
mentary vote against the use of force in
Syria in August 2013. However, any reassur-
ance would undoubtedly have slipped away
in the wake of a UK volte-face. Diplomatic
and reputational damage would have been
particularly acute for the Cameron govern-
ment because of particularities of the Anglo–
US ‘special relationship.’ Washington has
traditionally relied on Britain’s relatively
high levels of defence spending as a propor-
tion of GDP to hold other European NATO
states to account. If the UK defence budget
fell below the NATO target then it would
have become even harder for the US admin-
istration to persuade other European allies to
fund defence spending at or above the 2 per
cent threshold. Concerns in Washington
have been conﬁrmed in public opinion sur-
veys conducted by the Pew Research Center
which point to wavering commitment to the
NATO Article V commitment (that an attack
on one member state shall be considered an
attack on all) in many European member
states, in particular France, Germany and
Italy.10
Third, the Prime Minister was confronted
with a further imperative to meet the 2 per
cent threshold because of the effect of the
post-2010 defence budget cutbacks to UK
frontline force levels. The need to regularly
call on allies to try and ﬁnd submarines off
the British coast has been particularly embar-
rassing. Moreover, the Royal Navy (RN) is
temporarily without aircraft carriers (the two
currently under construction do not enter
service until 2018 and 2020). The RN’s
amphibious capability has been downgraded
to the extent that a number of ships are held
in reserve because of a lack of personnel to
crew them. The number of destroyer and fri-
gate surface escorts is at an all-time low and
the RN can no longer maintain its existing
deployment requirements, let alone retain
any form of surge capability.
At present, the Royal Air Force (RAF)
retains only eight frontline fast jet squadrons,
and it lacks a maritime patrol aircraft as a
direct result of the 2010 SDSR’s decision to
axe the Nimrod MRA4 programme. The
RAF’s force of Boeing E-3D airborne early
warning aircraft have not been updated,
unlike their US, French and NATO counter-
parts, and there are a number of secondary
squadrons utilising ﬁrst-generation Hawk
trainer aircraft that are approaching 40 years
old. Only the army looked in a fairly decent
shape, with its revised Future Force 2020
structure consisting of four frontline brigades
(sixteen Air Assault Brigade and three
armoured infantry brigades) within the
‘Reactive Force’ plus seven Infantry brigades
in the ‘Adaptable Force’.
Finally, the issues of Prime Ministerial
legacy and succession also played their part
in the about-turn. Like US Presidents in their
second term, for David Cameron the next
couple of years are all about his legacy, what
his tenure as prime minister will be remem-
bered for. A further diminution of the UK’s
armed forces and questions being raised
about the ‘UK’s place in the world’ needed
to be avoided if his legacy is to be bur-
nished, rather than tarnished. For George
Osborne, who has aspirations to succeed
David Cameron as Prime Minister, the issue
is more personal. He needs to balance devel-
oping a reputation as a prudent Chancellor
with evidence that he can think beyond the
government’s ﬁnances. He needs to avoid
antagonising the Conservative backbenches
and the senior ofﬁcer corps, both serving
and retired, who have a good deal of sup-
port from within the Conservative party
with further cuts to defence capabilities.
These four factors, taken together with
increasingly vocal lobbying from Conserva-
tive peers and MPs, altered the balance of
the decision. Cuts were less appealing; the
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volte-face more attractive. There were
domestic and international advantages to a
u-turn, not just in a security and strategic
sense, but also in a partisan and political
sense. There was political capital to be made
from a u-turn, for both David Cameron and
for George Osborne—indeed, it was not an
accident that it was the Chancellor, rather
than the Prime Minister, who announced the
UK’s commitment to the 2 per cent target.
On the face of it, this should be seen as a
real victory for British defence going for-
ward. But while the commitment to the 2
per cent threshold is welcome, it is only a
victory if the SDSR is a coherent strategy,
suitable for a rapidly changing world.
How coherent is the 2015 SDSR?
In the wake of the 2015 NSS and SDSR, the
criticism and dissatisfaction that has tradi-
tionally followed defence reviews has been
noticeable only by its absence. In that respect
it is reminiscent of the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review which a number of individuals, such
as retired General Jonathan Shaw, continue
to hold up as the pinnacle of excellence.11
However, as soon became apparent, the 1998
review was unaffordable—the government
decided what it was to do, the armed ser-
vices deﬁned their own shape and the toys
they wanted, only for the Treasury, in the
form of Gordon Brown, to deny the MoD
the funds needed to implement the review.
There are several reasons for fearing that his-
tory will repeat itself—that ﬂaws in the 2015
SDSR will, just as with the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review, undermine the SDSR.
SDSR 2015
In contrast to the 2010 NSS and SDSR, which
many think-tank analysts, retired senior
ofﬁcers and politicians have declared to be
strategically ﬂawed, the 2015 NSS and SDSR
have far more coherence. The single
combined 2015 white paper has a vision
about the UK’s so-called ‘place in the world’.
The document reﬂects the arguments articu-
lated in ‘Complex Security and Strategic
Latency’12 that the UK remains a ‘status quo
power’—a power that wishes to try and pre-
serve its relative standing in the world rather
than one wishing to move to a different
place. The 2015 White Paper puts the case
for a far more engaged UK than its predeces-
sor and seeks to overcome the charge of
‘strategic shrinkage’ levelled at its predeces-
sor. Moreover, the paper rightly recognises
that, in contrast to 2010, the outlook in 2015
looks far more menacing, and it recognises
the threats posed by Russia and IS along
with cyber security as Tier 1 concerns. Inevi-
tably, there will still be a few analysts argu-
ing that the government has failed to
articulate a vision of where the UK wishes to
move to. These, however, miss the point: in
an ideal world the relative power and inﬂu-
ence of the UK will remain as they are.
To support the maintenance of the status
quo and counter criticisms of Britain’s ‘strate-
gic shrinkage’, the Prime Minister pledged to
increase the UK’s ability to deploy forces for
a single large-scale operation from 30,000 to
50,000, increase the numbers of military per-
sonnel available to support the civilian
authorities against a terrorist incident from
5,000 to 10,000 and enhance a series of speci-
ﬁc defence capabilities. In particular, David
Cameron placed great emphasis on doubling
spending on the UK’s Special Forces, together
with the acquisition of a new generation of
armed drones—the Protector—which would
be acquired to replace and enhance the cur-
rent Reaper force of ten drones with at least
twenty new drones.
In his statement to the House of Com-
mons, Cameron placed great emphasis on
the funding ﬂowing into defence and secu-
rity for new equipment. He announced that
both the aircraft carriers would be brought
into service and each would have a squa-
dron of 12 F-35B joint strike ﬁghters by 2025.
As well as promising to publish a ship-
building strategy in 2016, Cameron also con-
ﬁrmed a reduction in the acquisition of Type
26 frigates from thirteen to eight, combined
with the development of a larger number of
cheaper frigates to make up the deﬁcit which
would, he hoped, mean that the RN’s force
of destroyers and frigates would be enlarged
at some point in the 2030s. Cameron also
promised that the navy would receive three
new stores support ships to help sustain the
new aircraft carriers and announced a delay
in the Trident successor system, along with a
signiﬁcant increase in the estimated cost of
that programme.
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On the land side, the big announcement
was the creation of two new army ‘Strike’
brigades capable of rapid deployment
around the world for operations against the
likes of IS. These would be equipped with
the new Scout vehicle that had been ordered
before the review. Cameron conﬁrmed his
pledge not to reduce the size of the regular
army further or cut any regiments.
However, it was in the air domain that the
announcements were most signiﬁcant. Along
with the promise of the two F-35 squadrons,
Cameron also announced the acquisition of
at least twenty Protector drones and nine
Boeing-P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to ﬁll the
capability left by the cancellation of the Nim-
rod MRA4 programme in 2010. In addition,
two Euroﬁghters squadrons, based on the
ﬁrst tranche of aircraft, would be retained in
service, thus increasing the number of fast
jet squadrons. Other platforms that would
now be retained until 2025 included an
expanded Shadow R1 force, the Sentry force
and some 14 Hercules C-130Js.
To support an increase in the defence
equipment and support budget for the next
decade by approximately £12 billion,
Cameron announced a further large reduc-
tion in civil service personnel within the
MoD. This time around it amounts to
approximately 30 per cent of the current
workforce, or some 14,000 people. Cameron
also conﬁrmed further sales of the defence
estate, amounting to some 30 per cent of
existing buildings.
A ﬂawed SDSR?
On the face of it, there is much to celebrate
in the 2015 SDSR. Appearances, however,
can be deceptive. In reality, just as with the
1998 Strategic Defence Review, there are a
number of holes within the 2015 NSS and
SDSR which, we suggest, will gradually
emerge and, in time, elicit a critical re-
evaluation of the 2015 White Paper. First,
and most important, the reality is that much
of the new cash pledged to defence equip-
ment and support over the next decade is
not actually new investment, but the reallo-
cation of funding from within the wider
defence budget. To balance the books the
government is relying on further large-scale
reductions in civil service personnel numbers
within the MoD and further sale of the
defence estate, and also quietly shifting the
requirement for capability force delivery
from 2020 to 2025, thereby further easing its
cash ﬂow.13
Each of these measures is problematic. In
the case of the reduction in civil servants,
the in-built assumption that greater efﬁ-
ciency will accrue because their work can
simply be picked up by others is optimistic
given that the MoD has been making contin-
uous efﬁciency savings since 1980. At some
point there are no more efﬁciencies. More-
over, a study undertaken by the National
Audit Ofﬁce of previous cuts to the Defence
Equipment and Support (DE&S) organisation
revealed that despite cuts of between 30 and
40 per cent in personnel, the overall cost of
the organisation had fallen by a mere £9 mil-
lion on an annual budget of approximately
£1.2 billion. The reason for the meagre sav-
ings was that the DE&S had to employ pri-
vate contractors to pick up the essential
workload displaced by its loss of in-house
personnel.14 In other words, the assumption
of savings linked to the planned reduction in
MoD civil servants is questionable, which
will inevitably raise questions about the
affordability of the current defence pro-
gramme.
Second, the government’s success to date
in generating funding by selling off parts of
the defence estate has been mixed. The prob-
lem frequently lies in the basis upon which
the building or land was originally acquired.
For example, the basis upon which much of
the estate was acquired before and during
the Second World War is that once it is no
longer needed it should returned to the orig-
inal owners or their heirs in the condition it
was acquired. This often involves signiﬁcant
expenditure for defence, rather than proﬁts
being made. Any failure to deliver the requi-
site proﬁts from the sale of major parts of
the defence estate will also raise questions
about the affordability of the current defence
programme.
Third, the 2015 SDSR has delayed a num-
ber of major programmes, such as the Tri-
dent successor system. This has created a
fundamental contradiction: on the one hand
the new NSS is predicated on the assump-
tion that the world is more dangerous, with
the range of threats growing; on the other,
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the SDSR outcomes are delaying the deploy-
ment of many of the capabilities the govern-
ment say are needed to counter those
threats. For example, the Prime Minister’s
promise that both aircraft carriers will ini-
tially be equipped with a squadron of twelve
F-35 joint strike ﬁghters needs to be set
within the context that each aircraft carrier is
designed to carry thirty-six F-35s. Procure-
ment delays mean that it will not be until
sometime in the 2030s that the aircraft carri-
ers receive their full air groups. Similarly,
the decision to delay the Trident successor
programme to the early 2030s and associated
recognition of programme cost increases has
raised questions about whether the UK will
be able to maintain its continuous at-sea
deterrence policy in the late 2020s. Such
delays in the delivery of new equipment and
capabilities will have an impact on the UK’s
ability to project military power and on its
interactions with allies. For example, in the
case of the aircraft carriers the RN is already
in discussion with the US Marine Corps
about US aircraft operating from the aircraft
carriers in order to provide a full air group.
In comparison to its 2010 predecessor, the
2015 SDSR has far greater coherence and
cogency, which explains the lack of criticism
levelled against it so far. However, our anal-
ysis suggests that beneath this veneer, the
2015 SDSR is predicated on a series of ﬁnan-
cial assumptions that simply do not stack
up. Delays to major programmes and ques-
tionable assumptions about efﬁciency sav-
ings risk leaving Britain’s armed forces
without the core capabilities required to
address the range of threats identiﬁed in the
NSS over the coming years.
Conclusions
For analysts of British defence policy, 2015
was a remarkable year. It witnessed a pro-
found and largely unexpected u-turn in gov-
ernment thinking on defence that has been
well received both within the armed forces
and by UK allies. When taken in conjunction
with the December 2015 parliamentary vote
to authorise air strikes in Syria, the govern-
ment is now in a position to argue that it
has moved the UK from a position of strate-
gic shrinkage to one in which it is resourced
for greater international engagement. Prime
Minister Cameron and his Chancellor,
George Osborne, have on ﬁrst appearances
‘pulled a rabbit out of the hat’.
However, as we have argued, in many
ways this is political sorcery—a well-worked
trick. In our view, the 2015 SDSR contains
vulnerabilities worryingly reminiscent of its
1998 predecessor. Amongst these, the most
worrying is the chasm, all too deep and too
wide, between the 2015 NSS/SDSR White
Paper’s vision for Britain’s place in the world
and the delays in capability development
and acquisition necessary to meet that
vision. The result is that, for careful obser-
vers, there are serious questions about the
government’s 2015 u-turn on defence: a vic-
tory in terms of meeting the 2 per cent
NATO target, undoubtedly, but whether it
will provide the wherewithal to balance the
UK’s national security aspirations with the
resources to meet them remains to be seen.
The danger is that the chasm between the
UK’s aspirations and its defence capabilities
approaches all too quickly.
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